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 Problems and Conclusions 
Security Cooperation in South Asia 
Overview, Reasons, Prospects 
South Asia continues to be one of the most important 
crisis regions in the 21st century. It is characterized 
by an interlocking web of old and new security risks. 
There are unresolved territorial disputes such as Kash-
mir and the recognition of the Durand Line; the pro-
liferation of nuclear technology; a broad range of 
ethnic, religious, and left-wing rebellions that have 
links to regional and global terrorist groups connected 
with organized crime; and the unpredictable reper-
cussions of climate change, which could turn one 
of the poorest regions in the world into a tinderbox. 
In contrast to Southeast and Central Asia, there 
are no regional organizations for security cooperation 
so far. But a closer look reveals a variety of forms of 
security collaboration between India and its neigh-
bors, but they have yet to be included in academic 
and political discussions. The present study offers an 
initial overview of existing forms of security cooper-
ation in the region. Moreover, it elaborates various 
reasons for the collaboration and future prospects. The 
main starting point is that regional security has to 
first be provided by affected states in the region rather 
than by extra-regional powers. The main findings are: 
1.  There is more security cooperation among 
member countries of the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) than is visible in the 
political and academic debates. The collaboration is 
mostly bilateral and depends on the overall relation-
ship between India and its neighbors. 
2.  The most important reason for the expansion of 
security cooperation is probably the change in India’s 
South Asia policy since the 1990s. India has been will-
ing to make unilateral concessions in bilateral con-
flicts and in economic cooperation. Today, India pur-
sues its security interests through cooperation with 
its neighbors and no longer by interfering in their 
domestic affairs. A related factor is that most govern-
ments in South Asia see the biggest threats coming 
from domestic challenges, such as various ethnic, reli-
gious, and communist rebellions, rather than from 
external forces, for instance from India, as was the 
case in the 1980s and 1990s. Hence, national security 
perceptions have converged, thereby opening the door 
for more security cooperation. 
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Problems and Conclusions 
3.  Because of the different types of conflicts in 
South Asia, an institutionalization of security co-
operation on the regional level, such as that exhibited 
by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), is not very likely to 
develop in this region. Regional security architecture 
will be characterized by a network of different forms 
of collaboration. 
4.  Extra-regional powers such as China and the 
United States have intensified their economic and 
security relations with South Asian countries. But they 
have only limited interest in becoming involved in the 
various domestic conflicts. Therefore, military cooper-
ation with extra-regional powers is not an obstacle for 
security collaboration among South Asia countries. 
5.  Given the complex security situation in the 
region, Germany and the European Union (EU) also 
have a high interest in fostering the process of secu-
rity cooperation. Although a multilateral security 
framework is missing, existing bilateral cooperation 
offers a variety of entry points to support security col-
laboration in this part of Asia. The improvement of 
the national security architecture and its democratic 
control is one of the most important areas. Most secu-
rity agencies in the region have been confronted with 
allegations of human rights violations. Moreover, the 
enforcement of the rule of law is impeded by deficits 
in the infrastructure of the courts and law enforce-
ment agencies. In the context of bilateral cooperation, 
Germany and the EU can improve the national secu-
rity architecture in South Asia, which at the same 
time may also contribute indirectly to better regional 
collaboration in this field. 
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 In Search of Security Cooperation in South Asia 
 
Debates about the regionalization of security policies 
in Asia increased enormously after the end of the 
East-West conflict.1 In Southeast Asia, the ARF, which 
was established in 1994, has been the most ambitious 
attempt to deal with regional security issues in a 
multilateral framework. In Central Asia, the member 
states of the SCO have put a strong emphasis on 
security issues since its creation in 2001. In East Asia, 
China’s rise and the possible implications on the 
territorial conflicts in the East and South China Sea – 
in addition to the rebalancing of US-Asia relations 
through the US “pivot” to Asia – have intensified the 
debate about regional security structures.2 
There have been no similar developments in South 
Asia. For many years, this part of Asia has been per-
ceived as a region of chronic instability and economic 
disintegration.3 On the one hand, the security situa-
tion is characterized by conventional boundary and 
territorial conflicts, for instance between India and 
Pakistan over Kashmir, and between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan on the recognition of the Durand Line. 
The Kashmir dispute led to three of the four wars 
between India and Pakistan and has triggered a con-
ventional and nuclear arms race, usurping resources 
that could have been used instead to tackle the eco-
nomic and social problems in both countries. 
On the other hand, the region is also plagued by a 
variety of non-conventional security threats. The pro-
liferation of nuclear technology by A. Q. Khan, the 
father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, and the regional 
and global networks of militant Islamic groups such 
as Lashkar-e-Toiba, which have links to Al Qaeda and 
1  See Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, 
ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2003); Amitav Acharya, “The Emerging Regional Architecture 
of World Politics,” World Politics 59, no. 4 (July 2007): 629–52. 
2  See Mely Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast 
Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies [ISEAS], 2005); Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific 
Century,” Foreign Policy (November 2011): 189, also accessible 
online at U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/ 
secretary/rm/2011/10/175215.htm (accessed January 10, 2014). 
3  The region South Asia includes the eight member states 
of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC): Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, 
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
are responsible for attacks in India and Afghanistan, 
are matters of serious international concern. More-
over, the region has a wide spectrum of ethnic and 
separatist movements from Baluchistan in Pakistan 
to India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, up to the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts in Bangladesh. For decades, civil strife and 
natural disasters have triggered internal migration 
and refugees in the region. Additionally, there are 
frequent violent clashes between religious communi-
ties, for instance between Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and 
Christians in India, and sectarian violence between 
Sunni and Shia groups in Pakistan. Left-wing extrem-
ism in India and Nepal adds another dimension to 
the already complex spectrum of conflict that has lost 
relevance in many other parts of the world. 
In the face of these multidimensional conflict sce-
narios in South Asia, closer security cooperation seems 
necessary but is regarded to be nearly impossible by 
many observers.4 There are currently no attempts to 
develop organizations such as the ARF or SCO to tackle 
common security challenges in the region. The limited 
academic discourse on regional security in South Asia 
focuses on Western or European experiences from the 
Cold War, for example the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, which was established in 
Helsinki in 1975.5 Because of the different starting 
positions concerning the conflicts and their causes, 
such a mechanism for South Asia does not seem to be 
too promising. First, there is no comparable confron-
tation between divergent ideological blocs, as with the 
Cold War. Second, territorial and minority disputes, 
4  See, among others, Regional Security in South Asia, ed. Sridhar 
K. Khatri (Kathmandu, 1987); Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building, 
and Reconciliation in South Asia, ed. Michael Krepon and Amit 
Sevak (New Delhi, 1996); Conflict and Violence in South Asia, ed. 
K. M. de Silva (Kandy, 2000); CBMs in South Asia: Potential and 
Possibilities, ed. Dipankar Banerjee (Colombo, 2000); Confidence 
Building Measures and Security Cooperation in South Asia. Challenges 
in the New Century, ed. Mohammad Humayun Kabir (Dhaka, 
2002); Politics and Security in South Asia. Salience of Religion and 
Culture, ed. A. K. M. Abdus Sabur (Dhaka, 2004). 
5  See Moonis Ahmar, “The Applicability of the Helsinki Model 
for the Task of Confidence-building and Conflict Resolution 
in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent,” Contemporary South Asia 3, 
no. 3 (1994): 237–56. In 1994 the CSCE was transformed into the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 
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In Search of Security Cooperation in South Asia 
which are central for South Asia, were not handled by 
institutions such as the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. 
But closer scrutiny reveals various forms of security 
cooperation between India and its neighbors that have 
developed in the past but have so far not found reso-
nance in academic discourse and political debates. 
This form of bilateral cooperation can be regarded as 
a starting point for regional security architecture. 
The main research questions are: 1) Which forms 
of security cooperation can be found in South Asia? 
2) What are the main reasons for this development? 
The starting point is that, independent from the debate 
whether the future international order is multipolar, 
non-polar, or multicomplex,6 the security challenges 
have to be tackled through closer cooperation between 
the affected countries rather than by international 
organizations or extra-regional powers.7 
The first part of the paper offers an overview of the 
different forms of security cooperation on the bi- and 
multilateral levels in the context of foreign relations 
and threat perceptions. Because of India’s geograph-
ical location, the focus is on its relations with its neigh-
bors.8 Pakistan is the only country with noteworthy 
6  See Richard N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will 
Follow U.S. Dominance,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (May/June 
2008): 44–56; see Ken Henry, Hu Shuli, Evan A. Feigenbaum, 
and Amitav Acharya, “‘Multiplex World’: Steps towards a New 
Global Order,” East Asia Forum, August 14, 2013, http://www. 
eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/14/multiplex-world-steps-towards-
a-new-global-order/ (accessed January 10, 2014). 
7  South Asia will not be regarded as a regional security com-
plex in the sense of Buzan; see Barry Buzan, “The South Asian 
Security Complex in a Decentring World Order: Reconsider-
ing Regions and Powers Ten Years On,” International Studies 
Quarterly 48, no. 1 (2011): 1–19. In contrast to a structural per-
spective, the study will use an actor-centric approach. 
8  The research literature and the availability of data are 
insufficient. The few sources are the annual reports of the 
Indian Ministry of External Relations and the Ministry of 
Defense and newspaper reports. Official documents from 
ministries and other institutions in the neighboring coun-
tries contain hardly any remarks on security cooperation 
with India. There are many contributions that deal with 
security challenges and problems in South Asia but hardly any-
thing on security cooperation in the region. On the general 
debate, see Alyson J. K. Bailes, “Regionalism and Security 
Building,” in Bailes et al., Regionalism in South Asian Diplomacy, 
SIPRI Policy Paper No. 15 (Solna: Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, February 2007), 1–11; see Sumit 
Ganguly, Counterterrorism Cooperation in South Asia: History and 
Prospects, NBR Reports 21 (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian 
Research, December 2009); Mahin Karim, The Future of South 
Asian Security: Prospects for a Nontraditional Regional Security 
Architecture (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, April 
forms of military cooperation with other South Asian 
countries. Since the 1960s, Pakistan has been working 
with Sri Lanka in military affairs and has also supplied 
arms to the government in Colombo in its fight against 
militant Tamil groups.9 Pakistan has also offered mili-
tary training for Afghan officers, but there has been 
hardly any interest from the government in Kabul to 
take up this offer due to the difficult bilateral relation-
ship between both countries.10 Compared to India, 
there are fewer accessible public sources on Pakistan’s 
security cooperation with South Asia, so these efforts 
will not be examined. 
The second part of the paper offers explanations 
as to why this form of security cooperation was estab-
lished. The first factor is India’s changed relationship 
with its neighbors. Second, there is growing congru-
ence about threat perceptions regarding security and 
stability between India and its neighbors. Finally, the 
question will be raised as to whether this bilateral se-
curity cooperation can be a starting point for regional 
security architecture. 
The focus of this study is the field of conventional 
intergovernmental cooperation. This includes mostly 
military cooperation, and in some cases also police col-
laboration. On the bilateral level, this includes a broad 
spectrum of activities: from military supplies, support 
for training, joint maneuvers, and military exercises 
to confidence-building measures. On the multilateral 
level, this form of cooperation can include joint decla-
rations about common threats as well as meetings or 
consultations on security-relevant issues. These forms 
of cooperation can be regarded as first steps for a future 
regional security architecture, which will consist 
of networks of different forms of collaboration. Geo-
graphically, the composition of the South Asia region 
is reflected in the membership of SAARC, which was 
established in 1985.11 Therefore, India’s security co-
operation with China and Myanmar will not be taken 
into account. The role of extra-regional powers such 
as China are elaborated upon briefly in the last part. 
2013); Bibhu Prasad Routray, “Crossing Borders. South Asia 
Revives Counter-terrorism Co-operation,” Jane’s Intelligence 
Review (January 2014): 28–33. 
9  See R. S. N. Singh, Asian Strategic and Military Perspective 
(New Delhi, 2005): 307. 
10  See “Experts Seek Stronger Ties between Pak-Afghan 
Militaries,” The News, March 30, 2013, http://www.thenews. 
com.pk/Todays-News-2-168362-Experts-seek-stronger-ties-
between-Pak-Afghan-militaries (accessed January 10, 2014). 
11  The founding members of SAARC were Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
Afghanistan became the eighth member in 2007. 
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 Security Cooperation in South Asia: 
An Attempt of an Overview       
 
The Bilateral Level: India and Its Neighbors 
Pakistan 
The literature on the unending conflict between India 
and Pakistan exceeds by far the contributions on the 
possibility of cooperation between the two states.12 
But despite the four wars and the various bilateral 
crises, both sides have also developed various forms of 
confidence-building measures in the nuclear, 
conventional, and non-conventional fields.13 The most 
important civilian example is the Indus Water Treaty, 
which was signed after mediation by the World Bank 
in 1960. Because of the treaty and its regulations, 
water has not been used as a weapon in the wars 
between both states since that time. 
During their rapprochement in the late 1980s, Indian 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistani Prime Min-
ister Benazir Bhutto agreed to exchange lists in 1988 
of nuclear installations in both countries that should 
not be attacked in the case of war. Since 1992 these 
lists have been exchanged every year on January 1. In 
2006 both countries agreed to pre-notification of test 
flights of ballistic missiles.14 In 2007 they signed an 
agreement to reduce the risk of accidents with nuclear 
weapons.15 
There are also various confidence-building mecha-
nisms in the conventional military field. A first hot-
line between the Directors General of Military Oper-
12  See Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending. India-Pakistan 
Tensions since 1947 (Oxford and New Delhi, 2002). 
13  For an overview on civilian and military confidence-
building measures, see Stimson Center, South Asia Confidence 
Building Measures (CBM) Timeline, http://www.stimson.org/ 
essays/nuclear-crisis-escalation-control-and-deterrence-in-
south-asia/ (accessed January 10, 2014). 
14  See “Agreement between India and Pakistan on Pre-
Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles,” http:// 
www.stimson.org/research-pages/agreement-between-india-
and-pakistan-on-pre-notification-of-flight-testing-of-ballistic-
missiles/ (accessed January 10, 2014). 
15  See “Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents 
Relating to Nuclear Weapons,” http://www.stimson.org/ 
research-pages/agreement-on-reducing-the-risk-from-
accidents-relating-to-nuclear-weapons/ (accessed January 
10, 2014). 
ations (DGMOs) was established over the Line of Con-
trol (LoC) in Kashmir after the war in 1971. Since 
1990, DGMOs are meant to have weekly exchanges. 
Although smaller skirmishes have been successfully 
settled, the hotline was not used – or was not able to 
defuse – tensions during major crises, for instance in 
1987, 1990, and before the Kargil War in 1999.16 The 
ceasefire at the LoC since the end of 2003 is another 
example of military agreements or understandings in 
this field.17 Since April 1991 both sides have followed 
an agreement to announce military maneuvers and 
large troop deployments.18 This was triggered by the 
threatening escalation in winter 1986/87, when the 
Indian Brasstacks exercise was interpreted as prepa-
ration for an upcoming military attack by Pakistan.19 
In addition to the conventional armed forces, 
the paramilitary border troops on both sides – for 
example the Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) and the Indian 
Border Security Force – are also conducting regular 
meetings at the border.20 Expert meetings in May 2005 
led to an agreement in October of the same year to 
establish a hotline between the Indian Coast Guard 
and the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency. Moreover, 
both institutions agreed on a memorandum of under-
standing to avoid incidents at sea.21 
16  See Muhammad Irshad, “Indo-Pak Confidence-Building 
Measures,” Defence Journal (August 2002), http://www. 
defencejournal.com/2002/august/confidence.htm (accessed 
January 10, 2014). 
17  For the incident in January of 2013, see “A Grandmother, 
a New Bunker Lead to India-Pakistan Clashes,” Dawn, January 
11, 2013, http://dawn.com/2013/01/11/a-grandmother-a-new-
bunker-lead-to-india-pakistan-clashes/ (accessed January 10, 
2014). 
18  See “Confidence-Building and Nuclear Risk-Reduction 
Measures in South Asia,” http://www.stimson.org/research-
pages/confidence-building-measures-in-south-asia-/ (accessed 
January 10, 2014). 
19  See Syed Rifaat Hussain, “The India Factor,” in Pakistan. 
Beyond the “Crisis State”, ed. Maleeha Lodhi (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 321. 
20  See “Types of Meeting with Indian Border Security 
Force (BSF),” Pakistan Rangers (Punjab), http://www. 
pakistanrangerspunjab. com/meetings.html (accessed Janu-
ary 10, 2014). 
21  See Sandeep Dikshit, “Partial Solution or a Step Forward?,” 
The Hindu, October 5, 2005, http://www.hindu.com/2005/10/ 
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Security Cooperation in South Asia: An Attempt of an Overview 
The biggest problem in the bilateral relationship 
in recent years has been attacks by militant Islamic 
groups operating from Pakistan. The Pakistani Army 
and the Inter-Services Intelligence supported these 
groups for many years in Kashmir and labeled them 
as “freedom fighters,” whereas India regarded them as 
“terrorists.” At the start of the composite dialogue in 
January 2004, President Pervez Musharraf declared 
that Pakistani territory should no longer be used for 
terrorist attacks against India. During the talks, both 
sides agreed on a Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism, the 
first meeting for which took place in March 2007. The 
Mechanism made it possible for both sides to share 
information on terrorist attacks, for instance on the 
Samjhauta-Express, in which several Pakistani citizens 
were killed in February 2007, or the attack on the 
Indian embassy in Kabul in summer 2008.22 
The Mumbai attack in November 2008 brought an 
end to the composite dialogue but did not lead to a 
similar crisis as in summer 2002. At that time, the 
bilateral tensions that followed the failed attack on 
the Indian parliament in December 2001 could only 
be solved through the diplomatic intervention of 
the United States and the United Kingdom. After the 
Mumbai attack, it seemed possible that India and 
Pakistan could intensify their anti-terror cooperation 
efforts. In reaction to the attack, the Pakistani govern-
ment announced they would send the chief of the 
Inter-Services Intelligence to India in order to support 
the Indian authorities in examining the incident.23 
But the visit did not materialize because of political 
resistance in Pakistan. 
The new political and economic rapprochement 
after 2010 was marred by various attacks and inci-
dents. India registered an increase of violations against 
the ceasefire at the LoC in Kashmir. There were 28 in-
cidents in 2009, 60 in 2011, and 117 in 2012.24 The 
05/stories/2005100508631400.htm (accessed January 10, 
2014); Government of India, Ministry of Defense, Annual 
Report 2005–2006 (New Delhi, 2006), 198. 
22  See Shabana Fayyaz, Indo-Pak Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism. 
Perspectives from Pakistan, IPCS Issue Brief 126 (New Delhi: In-
stitute of Peace and Conflict Studies, September 2009), http:// 
www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/IB126-Ploughshares-Shabhana.pdf 
(accessed January 10, 2014). 
23  See “Zardari, If Evidence Points to Any Group in My 
Country, I Shall Take the Strictest Action,” The Hindu, Novem-
ber 30, 2008, http://www.hindu.com/2008/11/30/stories/ 
2008113059220900.htm (accessed January 10, 2014). 
24  See Praveen Swami, “Green Books, Red Herring and the 
LoC War,” The Hindu, January 16, 2013, http://www.thehindu. 
killing of Indian and Pakistani soldiers in skirmishes 
at the LoC in January and August 2013 put stress upon 
the bilateral relationship once again. In their meeting 
in New York in September 2013, Prime Ministers Man-
mohan Singh and Nawaz Sharif promised to continue 
the rapprochement and to expand the confidence-
building measures. In December 2013, in their first 
personal meeting in 14 years, the DGMOs agreed to 
use the hotline in Kashmir more effectively in the 
future in order to prevent further incidents. With 
regard to the international border, they agreed on 
more concerted action against smuggling.25 
The numerous examples show that India and 
Pakistan have agreed on various confidence-building 
measures and have created new channels of commu-
nication in the field of security. However, this has not 
led to an improvement in their bilateral relationship. 
The political, economic, and military rapprochement 
will remain a rocky process accompanied by violent 
incidents and backlash. 
Afghanistan 
India and Afghanistan have traditionally had good 
relations, which are a result of their historic and com-
mon rivalry against Pakistan. Afghanistan was the 
only country to vote against Pakistan’s accession to 
the United Nations and has still not recognized the 
Durand Line as an international border. Pakistan has 
used the conflict with India to legitimize its interven-
tion in Afghanistan and its support for the Taliban in 
the 1990s. The Pakistani military wanted to achieve 
“strategic depth” and aimed to prevent “encirclement” 
by India.26 Therefore, the Afghan civil war in the 1990s 
was also a proxy war between India and Pakistan, in 
com/opinion/op-ed/green-books-red-herring-and-the-loc-
war/article4310197.ece (accessed January 10, 2014). 
25  See Gaurav Vivek Bhatnagar and Meena Menon, “DGMOs 
to Make Hotline ‘More Effective,’” The Hindu, December 25, 
2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/dgmos-to-
make-hotline-more-effective/article5498416.ece; “BSF, Pak 
Rangers Discuss Ways to Counter Smuggling,” The Hindu, 
December 25, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/ 
national/bsf-pak-rangers-discuss-ways-to-counter-smuggling/ 
article5501008.ece (accessed January 20, 2014). 
26  See “India’s Role in Afghanistan Is Encirclement of 
Pakistan,” Interview of Kaustav Dhar Chakrabarti with 
Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas, Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR, 
Islamabad), Observer Research Foundation, October 8, 2009, 
http://www.orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/html/interview/ 
interview.html (accessed January 10, 2014). 
SWP Berlin 
Security Cooperation in South Asia 
June 2014 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
The Bilateral Level: India and Its Neighbors 
which India and other powers supported the Northern 
Alliance against the Taliban. After the international 
community intervened in 2001, India became the 
biggest non-Western donor in Afghanistan and has 
invested more than US$1 billion since then. Pakistan 
is regarded as being responsible for nearly all the prob-
lems in Afghanistan, whereas India enjoys a very good 
reputation among the Afghan population.27 
In October 2011 India and Afghanistan signed a 
strategic partnership agreement, which is the basis 
for the military cooperation between the Indian Army 
and the Afghan Security Forces (ASF). The number of 
Afghan officers that will be trained in Indian military 
institutions should be expanded to at least 100. More-
over, India promised logistical support for the ASF 
with vehicles and technology.28 The military training 
takes place in India because the Indian government 
refuses to send instructors to Afghanistan due to secu-
rity concerns. With the partial withdrawal of the inter-
national forces, India gave in to American requests to 
increase its training capacities for Afghan officers.29 
Moreover, India will also train members of the Afghan 
police forces.30 For the 2013–2014 period, India plans 
to train more than 1,000 members of the ASF.31 In July 
2013, the Indian foreign minister, Salman Khurshid, 
refused the request by the Afghan government to sup-
ply “lethal” weaponry to Afghanistan. But he promised 
to continue support for training, transport, and logis-
tics.32 
27  This was the result of a survey by ABC News, BBC, and ARD 
in 2009. India received the highest positive assessment with 
29 percent, whereas Pakistan only received 2 percent, which 
was the lowest rate, even below the Taliban (3 percent) and 
on the same level as Osama bin Laden, see http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_01_10_afghanpoll.pdf (accessed 
January 10, 2014), 22–23. 
28  See Nitin Gokhale, “India All Set to Train Afghan Army,” 
New Delhi Television, November 17, 2011, http://www.ndtv.com/ 
article/india/india-all-set-to-train-afghan-army-150491 (ac-
cessed January 10, 2014). 
29  See Chidanand Rajghatta, “America Persuades India to 
Expand Afghan Footprint,” Times of India, June 14, 2012, 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-06-14/us/ 
32234576_1_afghanistan-and-pakistan-afghan-national-army-
afghan-military-personnel (accessed January 10, 2014). 
30  See Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual 
Report 2009–2010 (New Delhi, 2010), 115. 
31  See Routray, “Crossing Borders” (see note 8), 30. 
32  See “India Turns Down Afghanistan’s Arms Plea,” 
The Hindu, July 5, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/ 
international/south-asia/india-turns-down-afghanistans-arms-
plea/article4884695.ece (accessed January 10, 2014). 
Nepal 
India’s most enduring military relations in South Asia 
are probably those with Nepal. The Peace and Friend-
ship Treaty of 1950 regulated the bilateral relation-
ship with the Himalayan kingdom. The treaty also 
included secret letters that restricted the monarchy’s 
international room for maneuver in favor of India. 
Arms supplies to Nepal remained dependent upon 
India’s consent. India received privileges for develop-
ment projects and a veto on the employment of for-
eigners, which were regarded detrimental to India’s 
interests.33 India was also allowed to use military posts 
on the borders with China and Tibet. 
Military collaboration began in 1952, when King 
Tribhuvan called an Indian military support team for 
help with the reorganization of the Royal Nepalese 
Army.34 Nepal was also important militarily because 
India recruited its Gurkha regiments from there. Today, 
there are more than 12,000 former Gurkha soldiers in 
Nepal that have served in the Indian armed forces.35 
There were also tensions in the close bilateral rela-
tionship, which forced Nepalese kings and govern-
ments to attempt to establish closer relations with 
China in order to circumvent India’s influence. The 
Maoist rebellion against the monarchy and the demo-
cratically elected government between 1996 and 2006 
was also a special security challenge for India. The 
Maoists had close links to like-minded militant groups 
in India, which were regarded as the biggest domestic 
threat by the Indian government. Prachandra, the 
leader of the Maoist movement in Nepal, had studied 
at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and had 
links to several political parties in India. When the 
Nepalese king suspended the parliament in spring 
2005, India imposed various sanctions against the 
country, for instance an arms embargo, but not an 
embargo of non-lethal military supplies. 
Because of the escalating civil war, the Indian gov-
ernment decided to mediate a political compromise 
33  For the agreement and the letters, see S. D. Muni, Foreign 
Policy of Nepal (Delhi, 1973), 283–87. 
34  For the domestic development in Nepal, see Karl-Heinz 
Krämer, Ethnizität und nationale Integration in Nepal. Eine Unter-
suchung zur Politisierung der ethnischen Gruppen im modernen Nepal 
(Stuttgart, 1996), 78–116. 
35  See Embassy of India, Kathmandu, Nepal, About Defence, 
http://www.indianembassy.org.np/index1.php?option= 
e6r5wlVM8od_u8Y0CdwsDiTfg0cohLLpEcNS8hphu-0&id= 
3CWw9BCDofdrmruend-0Mb77tSsVdGG_AXp9hgua2T4 
(accessed April 5, 2013). 
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between the monarchy, the democratic parties, and 
the Maoists. In November 2005, the parties and the 
Maoists agreed to join hands in their protests against 
the monarchy and received political concessions in 
spring 2006. In November of the same year, the gov-
ernment and the political parties signed a peace agree-
ment. In April 2008 elections for the first constitu-
tional assembly were held, in which the Maoists 
became the strongest political party.36 
Despite India’s successful mediation in the civil 
war, the relationship with the big neighbor to 
the south created controversial debates among the 
Nepalese parties.37 On the one hand, Nepal has close 
political, economic, and cultural relations with India 
because of its open border and high levels of labor 
migration. During the authoritarian phases, many 
Nepalese politicians found refuge in India and have 
established links with different political parties in 
India. On the other hand, India’s large-scale engage-
ment is perceived very critically in Nepal because 
many fear dependence and a selling out of national 
interests in favor of the southern neighbor. 
Military relations are still good between the two 
states. Every year a sizable number of Nepalese sol-
diers are trained in India.38 Both sides agreed on closer 
collaboration in the fight against terrorism and have 
established a series of new institutions. Among others, 
there is the Nepal-India Bilateral Consultative Group 
on Security Issues, the Joint Working Group on Border 
Management, and the Border District Coordination 
Committee.39 
The Indian government wants to fight the activities 
of Maoist groups and wishes to prevent Nepal’s open 
border with India from becoming the main entry point 
for militant Islamic fighters. The hijacking of the 
36  See Sandra Destradi, Indian Foreign and Security Policy in 
South Asia. Regional Power Strategies (London and New York, 
2012), 106–128. 
37  See Prashant Jha, “Nepal’s Maoist Leader Fires a Salvo 
at His Own Party Government,” The Hindu, March 27, 2012, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/nepals-maoist-
leader-fires-a-salvo-at-his-own-party-government/article3248 
385.ece (accessed January 10, 2014). 
38  “A Substantial Number of Nepal Army (NA) Personnel 
Undergo Training in Indian Military Institutions Every Year,” 
in: Government of India, Ministry of Defense, Annual Report 
2010–2011 (New Delhi, 2011), 167. 
39  See Akanshya Shah, “Nepal: Terrorist Arrests and Cooper-
ation with India,” South Asia Weekly Report (Observer Research 
Foundation) 6 (September 6, 2013): 36, http://orfonline.org/ 
cms/sites/orfonline/modules/weeklyassessment/Weekly 
AssessmentDetail.html?cmaid=56872&mmacmaid=56873& 
volumeno=VI&issueno=36 (accessed January 10, 2014). 
Indian Airline flight in December 1999, during which 
India had to release three high-ranking terrorists, 
started in Kathmandu. In summer 2013, two leading 
terrorists – Abdul Karim Tunda, who is regarded to be 
one of the chief ideologues of Lashkar-e-Toiba, which 
operates from Pakistan, and Yasin Bhatkal, who is per-
ceived to be a cofounder of the Indian Mujahideen – 
were arrested at the Nepal border.40 
For many years, India has supported the training 
and equipping of the Nepali police. The formal and 
informal networks have supported cross-border co-
operation among the security agencies on both sides 
and have improved the fight against terrorism and 
counterfeit currencies.41 In July 2013, the Indian arms 
embargo was lifted and India will soon start their 
joint military exercises with the Nepali Army again.42 
Bhutan 
India has also developed an extensive military col-
laboration with Bhutan that is not as controversial as 
the one with the Himalayan kingdom of Nepal. The 
Friendship treaty of August 1949 gave India substan-
tial influence in handling the foreign policy and inter-
national affairs of Bhutan. With the treaty, India also 
intended to protect its security interest vis-à-vis China 
in the Himalaya region. 
Since 1961, the Indian Border Roads Organisation, 
a unit of the Engineer Corps of the Indian Army, has 
been doing infrastructural work in Bhutan, for in-
stance, building the airport in Paro.43 India has also 
supported Bhutan economically with substantial 
means. For many years, the kingdom has been the 
biggest recipient of India’s development cooperation. 
40  See Devesh K. Pandey, “‘LeT Ideologue’ Tunda in Police 
Custody,” The Hindu, August 17, 2013, http://www.thehindu. 
com/news/national/let-ideologue-tunda-in-police-custody/ 
article5031691.ece; Rahi Gaikwad, “Indian Mujahideen Co-
founder Yasin Bhatkal Arrested,” The Hindu, August 29, 2013, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indian-mujahideen-
cofounder-yasin-bhatkal-arrested/article5070960.ece (both 
accessed January 10, 2014). 
41  See B. Raman, “Rise of Maoists in Nepal. Implications for 
India,” Indian Defence Review 23, no. 3 (July–September 2008): 
128. 
42  See “India to Resume Arms Supply to NA after 8-year Gap,” 
The Kathmandu Post, July 11, 2013. 
43  See “Bhutan’s Army Launched First Attack in Its History 
to Help India,” Pakistan Defence, June 9, 2010, http://www. 
defence.pk/forums/military-history-strategy/71854-bhutans-
army-launched-first-attack-its-history-help-india.html# 
ixzz2PxI9yMQ5 (accessed April 9, 2013). 
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In 2012/13 more than 36 percent of funds from the 
Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Program 
went to Bhutan.44 The Indian government has also 
been financing the construction of dams for hydro-
electric power produced by Indian companies for 
many years. Bhutan is producing enough electricity 
for it to be exported to northern India. Already in 
1963, the Indian Military Training Team was set up 
for Bhutan in order to support the training of the 
Bhutanese forces.45 In 2007, the total strength of the 
Bhutanese forces was 9,021 soldiers.46 Both countries 
have established the India-Bhutan Joint Group on 
Border Management and Security.47 
In 2003, the military cooperation between both 
countries reached a new level of importance. Since the 
1990s, a variety of militant groups that are operating 
in India’s northeast had set up camps in the southern 
part of Bhutan. Pushed by the Indian government, the 
Bhutanese forces started a large-scale military oper-
ation in December 2003 and were able to destroy all 
30 camps of the militant groups by January 2004.48 
The Indian Army did not take part in the fighting but 
supported the Bhutanese forces logistically and with 
medical services.49 
Bhutan’s close political and economic relations 
with India were also an important issue during the 
second democratic election in 2008. But the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Jigme Thinley tried to distance 
itself from India through a rapprochement with China 
and other countries. The attempt by Bhutan to reorient 
its foreign policy was not welcomed in New Delhi. 
The Indian government delayed supplies and did not 
prolong a treaty on subsidies for gas and energy, 
44  See Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 
Annual Report 2012–2013 (New Delhi, 2013), 210. 
45  See Government of India, Ministry of Defense, Annual 
Report 2011–2012 (New Delhi, 2012), 190. 
46  See “Bhutan to Reduce Army Strength, Raise Militia 
Force,” The Times of India, June 24, 2007, http://articles. 
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2007-06-24/rest-of-world/ 
27977330_1_royal-bhutan-army-militia-rba (accessed Janu-
ary 10, 2014). 
47  See Government of India, Ministry of Defense, Annual 
Report 2005–2006 (New Delhi, 2006), 198. 
48  See “Bhutan’s Army Launched First Attack in Its History 
to Help India,” Pakistan Defence (September 6, 2010), http:// 
www.defence.pk/forums/military-history-strategy/71854-
bhutans-army-launched-first-attack-its-history-help-india. 
html#ixzz2PxI9yMQ5 (accessed April 9, 2013). 
49  See Dipankar Banerjee and Bidhan S. Laishram, Bhutan’s 
‘Operation All Clear’: Implications for Insurgency and Security Co-
operation, IPCS Issue Brief 18 (New Delhi: Institute of Peace 
and Conflict Studies, January 2004), 1. 
leading to an increase in prices before the elections. 
Moreover, the Bhutanese currency, which is linked to 
the Indian rupee, lost also value because of the latter’s 
depreciation. These developments favored the oppo-
sition of the People’s Democratic Party, which won the 
election in July 2013.50 The new government of Prime 
Minister Tshering Tobgay announced the continuation 
of close cooperation with India, including on security 
issues.51 
Bangladesh 
The security collaboration between New Delhi and 
Dhaka has always been dependent on the political 
constellations in Bangladesh. With the military inter-
vention into the civil war in East Pakistan, India made 
the independence of Bangladesh possible in 1971. The 
new Bangladeshi government, under the leadership of 
the Awami League, was closely oriented toward India 
until the military coup in 1975. The subsequent mili-
tary dictators followed more independent economic 
and foreign policies and distanced the country from 
India until 1990. After democratization in 1990/91, 
the Awami League began closer collaboration with 
India once again, whereas the Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party was always much more critical of their neighbor. 
Water-sharing of the Ganges had stressed the bilat-
eral relationship for decades and could only be settled 
with a treaty in 1996. In autumn 2011, another treaty 
concerning the sharing of the Teesta River could not 
be signed because of political intervention by the state 
government in West Bengal and its chief minister, 
Mamata Banerjee.52 
In the realm of security cooperation, the main focus 
points were border disputes, illegal migration, and the 
controversy over camps of militant groups on Bangla-
deshi territory. After long negotiations, the conflict 
50  See Aby Tharakan, “Too Much Dragon, Too Little King-
dom,” The Hindu, July 16, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/ 
opinion/op-ed/too-much-dragon-too-little-kingdom/ 
article4918267.ece (accessed January 10, 2014). 
51  See Chander Suta Dogra, “I Will Build on Five Decades of 
Friendship with India” (interview), The Hindu, July 19, 2013, 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/i-will-build-on-
five-decades-of-friendship-with-india/article4928684.ece 
(accessed January 10, 2014). 
52  See Priya Sahgal and Partha Dasgupta, “CM Pours Cold 
Water over PM,” India Today, September 10, 2011, http:// 
indiatoday.intoday.in/story/teesta-water-sharing-talks-put-off-
mamata-banerjee-manmohan/1/150681.html (accessed Janu-
ary 10, 2014). 
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over the territorial enclaves was settled in September 
2011.53 Of even greater domestic importance is the 
illegal migration of Bangladeshis into India. Census 
reports from the border state of West Bengal indicate 
an above-average increase of Muslims. This cannot be 
explained only by higher birth rates but also by the 
large influx of Bangladeshis. As Bengali is the common 
language on both sides of the border, the migrants can 
integrate rather easily into the local population. In the 
past, illegal migration led to riots against Bangladesh-
is in the state of Assam. Territorial disputes, illegal 
migration, and trafficking have been the source of 
many incidents in recent years. According to Human 
Rights Watch, 900 Bangladeshis and 164 Indian were 
killed by the Indian Border Security Force between 
2000 and 2010.54 In recent years, border troops have 
improved their communication channels, leading to 
a decrease in the number of incidents. 
The most contentious issues have been over the 
camps of different separatist groups in Bangladesh 
that operate in the northeast of India and the infil-
tration of Islamic terrorists into India. In 2002 India 
handed over a list of 99 camps of different militant 
groups in Bangladesh and asked the government 
in Dhaka to close them down.55 But the Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party government of Prime Minister 
Khaleda Zia, who collaborated with religious parties 
that presumably had links to militant groups, was 
not inclined to follow the Indian proposal. 
In recent years both states have extended their 
security cooperation. Since 2007 there have been joint 
border patrols. After the victory of the Awami League, 
which is traditionally close to India, joint military 
exercises were held, followed by naval exercises in 
53  See “Across Table, India & Bangla Cross Borders,” 
The Economic Times, September 18, 2004, http://articles. 
economictimes.indiatimes.com/2004-09-18/news/27389940_ 
1_cross-border-terrorism-joint-boundary-check-cross-border-
movement (accessed January 10, 2014); Shakhawat Liton and 
Dilip Roy, “Two Enclaves Float in Joy: PM Uses Tin Bigha Cor-
ridor, Stresses Better Ties with India,” The Daily Star, October 
20, 2011. 
54  See Haroon Habib, “Putting Down the Burden of Borders,” 
The Hindu, February 10, 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/ 
opinion/lead/putting-down-the-burden-of-borders/article 
2876322.ece (accessed January 10, 2014). 
55  See Kanchan Lakshman and Sanjay K. Jha, “India-Bangla-
desh: Restoring Sovereignty on Neglected Borders,” in: Fault-
lines, ed. K. P. S. Gill, Vol. XIV, 2003, South Asia Terrorism Portal, 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume 
14/Article7.htm (accessed January 10, 2014). 
2010.56 In the same year, India and Bangladesh signed 
various agreements, one of which concerned the fight 
against international terrorism, organized crime, 
and drug trafficking.57 In January 2013 both countries 
agreed on an extradition treaty in order to improve 
the fight against terrorism and cross-border crime.58 
Sri Lanka 
With the exception of Pakistan, security cooperation 
with Sri Lanka was the most difficult. The conflict 
between the Singhalese majority and the Tamil minor-
ity has shaped the domestic development of the island 
since its independence in 1948. This controversy has 
spilled over to India’s domestic politics via Tamil par-
ties in the state of Tamil Nadu and has repeatedly 
burdened the bilateral relationship between both 
countries. 
The first noteworthy security collaboration took 
place in 1971, when India supported the Sri Lankan 
government in suppressing an armed leftist rebellion. 
India sent helicopters and the Navy patrolled the 
southern coast of the island, which was a stronghold 
of the rebels, in order to prevent supplies of arms from 
reaching them.59 
In the conflict between the Singhalese and the Sri 
Lanka Tamils, India supported various militant Tamil 
groups in the beginning that were trained in the 
southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. When the civil 
war escalated, India began to mediate between 
the two sides. In 1987, India and Sri Lanka signed an 
56  See “Indo-Bangla Military Cooperation Increasing,” 
The Times of India, November 22, 2011, http://articles. 
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-11-22/pune/30428193_ 
1_military-exercise-bangladesh-army-bangladesh-military-
academy (accessed January 10, 2014); “India-Bangladesh 
Border Guards Joint Border Patrol,” NorthEast Today, August 
8, 2012, http://www.northeasttoday.in/our-states/meghalaya/ 
india-bangladesh-border-guards-joint-border-patrol/ (accessed 
April 9, 2013). 
57  See “India, Bangladesh Vow to Fight Terror in All Forms,” 
Zee News, September 7, 2011, http://zeenews.india.com/news/ 
nation/india-bangladesh-vow-to-fight-terror-in-all-forms_ 
730403.html (accessed January 10, 2014). 
58  See Binodkumar S. Singh, “India – Bangladesh: Con-
tinuous Consolidation,” South Asian Outlook (March 2013), 
http://www.southasianoutlook.net/index.php/issue/2013/ 
41-march/498-india-bangladesh-continuous-consolidation 
(accessed January 10, 2014). 
59  See Vijay Sakhuja, “India and Sri Lanka. Towards a 
New Relationship,” Indian Defence Review 19, no. 4 (October–
December 2004): 158. 
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accord that deployed the Indian Peace Keeping Forces 
to the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka. This 
was the first and only deployment of Indian troops on 
the basis of a bilateral treaty and without a mandate 
from the United Nations.60 
The deployment was a military and political fiasco 
because the conflicting parties – the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) – turned against India and began partial co-
operation. In spring 1990, the Indian Peace Keeping 
Forces left Sri Lanka without having ended the civil 
war. With the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi during the election campaign in Tamil Nadu 
in 1991, the LTTE lost all of its credibility among 
political parties in India. 
During the 1990s, India refrained from any further 
interventions into the civil war. The Indian govern-
ment did not have an official part in the negotiation 
process, which was mediated by Norway and which 
led to the ceasefire in 2002 and the creation of the Sri 
Lanka Monitoring Mission. Moreover, India did not 
belong to the group of co-chairs that accompanied the 
process of economic reconstruction during the peace 
process.61 
In October 2004, India and Sri Lanka agreed to 
expand their military cooperation in the fight against 
the LTTE. In December of the same year, the naval 
forces conducted their first military exercises in order 
to interrupt the maritime supply lines of the LTTE.62 
India supported the training of the Sri Lankan police 
and the armed forces and provided military equip-
ment. Because of the political opposition in Tamil 
Nadu, India was reluctant to export lethal weapons.63 
Although the Sri Lankan government had signaled 
its interest in a defense agreement with India, New 
Delhi refused such an official agreement because it 
feared opposition from Tamil parties that were in the 
ruling coalition.64 But India and Sri Lanka continued 
60  See S. D. Muni, Pangs of Proximity. India and Sri Lanka’s Ethnic 
Crisis (New Delhi, 1993). 
61  The four co-chairs were Norway, Japan, the United States, 
and the European Union. 
62  See Sakhuja, “India and Sri Lanka” (see note 59), 158. 
63  See V. S. Sambandan, “Sri Lankan Police to Be Trained in 
India,” The Hindu, September 29, 2005, http://www.hindu.com/ 
2005/09/29/stories/2005092901211300.htm; “Do Not Extend 
Military Aid to Sri Lanka: Vaiko,” The Hindu, July 20, 2006, http:// 
www.hindu.com/2006/07/20/stories/2006072006651000.htm 
(both accessed January 10, 2014). 
64  See V. S. Sambandan, “Sri Lankan Defence Team to Visit 
India,” The Hindu, January 12, 2004, http://www.hindu.com/ 
their cooperation in order to block the support net-
works of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu and their maritime 
supply lines.65 
Until the end of the civil war in May 2009, the intel-
ligence agencies of both countries shared knowledge, 
and both sides conducted joint military operations, 
which weakened the supplies of the LTTE and its readi-
ness for combat in the final phase of the war.66 Offi-
cially, India only provided two surveillance radars but 
there were also reports that India sent one patrol boat 
and five helicopters to Sri Lanka.67 
In May 2009, the LTTE suffered a devastating defeat 
when most of the units and the inner circle of the 
leadership were killed. Because of its experiences with 
the LTTE and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, India 
was interested in the elimination of the military arm 
of the LTTE. But the Indian government also criticized 
the high number of civilian casualties among the 
Tamil population in the final phase of the war, casual-
ties that were attributed both to the LTTE and the Sri 
Lankan security forces, according to a report by the 
United Nations (UN) Secretary-General.68 
Even after the end of the civil war, the Tamil ques-
tion continued to shape the bilateral relationship 
between the two countries. The Sri Lankan govern-
ment was not willing to pursue a final political 
solution after the military defeat of the LTTE. India 
demanded such a political settlement several times 
and pointed to the accord of 1987, which is the blue-
print for a peaceful solution and was responsible for 
the administrative reorganization of Sri Lanka that 
is still in effect today. At the same time, the Indian 
government became engaged in the reconstruction of 
the Tamil regions in the north and east, which were 
heavily damaged. 
2004/01/12/stories/2004011203121200.htm (accessed January 
10, 2014). 
65  See V. Suryanarayan, “Sea Tigers – Threat to Indian Secu-
rity,” The Hindu, July 28, 2004, http://www.hindu.com/2004/ 
07/28/stories/2004072802311000.htm (accessed January 10, 
2014). 
66  See “India’s Naval Surveillance Big Help – FM,” Ministry 
of Defense and Urban Development, Sri Lanka, December 30, 
2010, http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20080605_01 
(accessed January 10, 2014). 
67  See Sandra Destradi, India and the Civil War in Sri Lanka: 
On the Failures of Regional Conflict Management in South Asia, GIGA 
Working Paper No. 154 (Hamburg: German Institute of Global 
and Area Studies, December 2010), 13–14. 
68  Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on United 
Nations Action in Sri Lanka (n.p., November 2012), http://www. 
un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_ 
Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.pdf (accessed January 10, 2014). 
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The domestic situation in Sri Lanka also became 
an issue in India and had national and international 
repercussions. Because of pressure from Tamil parties 
in the coalition government, the Indian government 
voted for a resolution against Sri Lanka in the United 
Nations Human Rights Council in spring 2012. It was 
the first time that India voted for a resolution that 
demanded intervention into the domestic affairs of 
another country.69 
Despite their bilateral disagreements, both coun-
tries continued their security cooperation. In 2011, 
New Delhi and Colombo agreed on an annual defense 
dialogue and regular talks between the different mili-
tary services of both countries. India offered 1,400 
places in its training institutions for the Sri Lankan 
security forces, and the naval forces conducted joint 
military exercises in Sri Lankan waters for the first 
time.70 In 2012, the training of Sri Lankan officers in 
Tamil Nadu led to protests, forcing the Indian defense 
ministry to send them back to Sri Lanka.71 In spring 
2013, India’s voting behavior in the United Nations 
Human Rights Council even created a coalition crisis 
in New Delhi. The Indian government supported 
the draft resolution of the United States so that the 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) left the ruling 
United Progressive Alliance. The DMK criticized that 
the resolution was too soft and called for the creation 
of an independent international inquiry into the war 
crimes in Sri Lanka.72 In reaction to the domestic tur-
69  See “India Votes for Resolution against Sri Lanka,” The 
Hindu, March 22, 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/news/ 
international/india-votes-for-resolution-against-sri-lanka/ 
article3150059.ece (accessed January 10, 2014). 
70  See R. K. Radhakrishnan, “India Offers Training Slots for 
Sri Lankan Military Personnel,” The Hindu, December 28, 2010, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-offers-
training-slots-for-sri-lankan-military-personnel/article1011469. 
ece (accessed January 10, 2014). 
71  See “All Sri Lankan Trainees to Be Sent Off Today: Defence 
Ministry,” The Economic Times, July 6, 2012, http://articles. 
economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-07-06/news/32566225_ 
1_sri-lankan-air-defence-ministry-tamils (accessed January 10, 
2014). 
72  See “India Votes against Sri Lanka at UNHRC, DMK Slams 
Govt for Diluting Resolution,” The Times of India, March 21, 
2013, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-03-21/ 
india/37902646_1_llrc-unhrc-sri-lanka; B. Kolappan, “DMK 
Quits UPA Ship, But Won’t Sink It,” The Hindu, March 19, 2013, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/dmk-quits-upa-ship-
but-wont-sink-it/article4525097.ece (both accessed January 10, 
2014). 
moil, the Indian government temporarily suspended 
the annual defense talks with Sri Lanka.73 
The Sri Lankan example illustrates the kinds of 
domestic problems that India faces when it pursues 
security cooperation with its neighbors. The Indian 
government has emphasized that it will continue its 
collaboration and signed an Anti-Terror Agreement 
with Sri Lanka in January 2013.74 The training of Sri 
Lankan security personnel, which seems to be quite 
substantive in some parts, may be partially shifted to 
other states in order to circumvent the reservations 
of Tamil parties. A Sri Lankan admiral declared that 
nearly 80 percent of the national Army officers com-
plete parts of their training in India.75 
Maldives 
Security collaboration between India and the Maldives 
started in 1988. In November of the same year, Tamil 
rebels or mercenaries, who had been hired by Maldiv-
ian business men, planned a coup on the Maldives. At 
that time, the small island state had neither a regular 
Army nor a Navy but only a National Security Service 
with some 1,400 personnel. Hence, President Mau-
moon Abdul Gayoom turned toward India for military 
support. The Indian military was able to easily sup-
press the coup and arrested the militants.76 
In 2005, the Maldives sent a military attaché to the 
embassy in Delhi in order to strengthen military rela-
tions. In 2006, India offered a patrol boat as a gift to 
the Maldivian Navy. Since 2009, the Indian and Mal-
73  See Vinay Kumar and Sandeep Dikshit, “Defence Dialogue 
with Sri Lanka Called Off,” The Hindu, March 18, 2013, http:// 
www.thehindu.com/news/national/defence-dialogue-with-sri-
lanka-called-off/article4522570.ece (accessed January 10, 2014). 
74  See J. Balaji, “Sri Lankans Will Continue to Train in India, 
Says Centre,” The Hindu, August 27, 2012, http://www. 
thehindu.com/news/national/sri-lankans-will-continue-to-
train-in-india-says-centre/article3827983.ece; “India, Sri Lanka 
Sign Anti-terror, Tax Evasion Pacts,” The Hindu, January 22, 
2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-sri-
lanka-sign-antiterror-tax-evasion-pacts/article4332894.ece 
(both accessed January 10, 2014). 
75  See Meera Srinivasan, “Navy Cadets of India, Sri Lanka 
Speak the Same Language,” The Hindu, April 20, 2013, http:// 
www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/navy-
cadets-of-india-sri-lanka-speak-the-same-language/article 
4636943.ece (accessed January 10, 2014). 
76  See Ravinatha Aryasinha, “Maldives, Sri Lanka and the 
‘India Factor,’” Himāl Southasian, March 1997, http://www. 
himalmag.com/component/content/article/2650-maldives- 
sri-lanka-and-the.html (accessed January 10, 2014). 
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divian forces have held annual military exercises, and 
the navies undertake joint maneuvers and patrols. 
India has integrated the Maldives into the surveillance 
system of its own islands, for instance by setting up 
radar units on the Maldives and through surveillance 
flights of the Indian Air Force over the island state.77 
Moreover, India, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka have 
agreed on closer cooperation in order to fight piracy, 
terrorist networks, and trafficking in their territorial 
waters.78 In July 2013, the three countries signed an 
agreement on this.79 
The Multilateral Level: Security in the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
In global comparison, SAARC, which was established 
in 1985, is among the least successful regional organi-
zations. The bilateral conflicts among the member 
states and the lack of economic complementarity are 
regarded as the greatest obstacles responsible for the 
slow process of cooperation. Officially, contentious 
issues have been excluded from the SAARC agenda. 
But the member states have time and again used the 
SAARC summit meetings to discuss bilateral conflicts, 
such as the tensions between India and Pakistan and 
the Tamil issue in Sri Lanka, at the highest political 
level. 
In the context of SAARC, there are only a few in-
struments for security cooperation. The most impor-
77  See Manu Pubby, “India Bringing Maldives into Its Secu-
rity Net,” The Indian Express, August 13, 2009, http://www. 
indianexpress.com/news/India-bringing-Maldives-into-its-
security-net/501583 (accessed April 25, 2013); Rajat Pandit, 
“India to Further Bolster Defence Cooperation with Mal-
dives,” The Times of India, April 15, 2013, http://articles. 
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-04-15/india/38555022_ 
1_indian-ocean-region-india-and-maldives-maritime-patrol-
and-surveillance; Vinay Kumar, “India, Maldives Holding Joint 
Military Training Exercises,” The Hindu, November 12, 2012, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-maldives-
holding-joint-military-training-exercises/article4091069.ece 
(both accessed January 10, 2014). The Andamans and Nicobars 
in the Gulf of Bengal as well as the Lakshadweep Islands, 
which are north of the Maldives, belong to India. 
78  See Vijay Sakhuja, Maritime Security and Piracy: Issues, Responses 
and Multilateral Cooperation in South Asia, EU-Asia Dialogue, 
Research Paper (Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, April 
2013). 
79  See Meera Srinivasan, “Indian Ocean Security Pact Signed,” 
The Hindu, July 9, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/ 
international/south-asia/indian-ocean-security-pact-signed/ 
article4898042.ece (accessed January 10, 2014). 
tant document is the Regional Convention on Sup-
pression of Terrorism, which was already signed in 
1987. But because of their divergent positions toward 
Kashmir, neither India nor Pakistan could agree on 
a common definition of terrorism, so the document 
remained meaningless. Following UN declaration 
1373 of September 28, 2001, SAARC passed the Addi-
tional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on 
Terrorism. The common terrorist threat was addressed 
at several SAARC summits, but it took a long time to 
arrive at more concrete forms of cooperation.80 
In 1992 the interior ministers established the SAARC 
Drug Offences Monitoring Desk in Colombo in order to 
bundle information about the regional networks for 
drug trafficking. In 1995, the SAARC Terrorist Offences 
Monitoring Desk was set up in Colombo in order to col-
lect and exchange information on terrorist activities.81 
With the aim of fighting cross-border crime and dis-
cussing issues such as arms-, drugs-, and human-traf-
ficking and money laundering, there were annual 
meetings between the heads of police of all SAARC 
members between 1996 and 2007; since 2007 the meet-
ings have been biannual.82 Since 2006, the member 
states have been discussing the creation of SAARCPOL, 
a common regional police institution that would work 
similarly to Interpol.83 
Although the member states recognize and iden-
tify common problems in the fields of terrorism and 
organized crime, there have been hardly any note-
worthy collaboration in the SAARC context. India 
and Pakistan still do not have an extradition treaty 
because of their difficult relationship.84 In 2008, all 
states agreed on the SAARC Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters, which has various 
80  See Arndt Michael, India’s Foreign Policy and Regional Multi-
lateralism (Basingstoke/New York, 2013), 104–105. 
81  See SAARC Secretariat, “SAARC Terrorist Offences Moni-
toring Desk (STOMD),” http://saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/ 
detail.php?activity_id=24 (accessed January 10, 2014). 
82  See SAARC Secretariat, “SAARC Conference on Coopera-
tion in Police Matters,” http://saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/ 
detail.php?activity_id=20; see “SAARC Home Ministers’ Con-
ference Concludes,” The Economic Times, October 25, 2007, 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2007-10-25/ 
news/27667901_1_saarc-home-ministers-islamabad-assistance-
in-criminal-matters (both accessed January 10, 2014). 
83  See “Rare Blend. Regional Police Force, SAARCPOL, May 
Become a Reality Soon,” Force (September 2012), http://www. 
forceindia.net/SepCoverstory14.aspx (accessed January 10, 
2014). 
84  See Sandy Gordon, “Regionalism and Cross-Border Co-
operation against Crime and Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific,” 
Security Challenges 5, no. 4 (summer 2009): 75–102 (85). 
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exemptions that limit cooperation. Moreover, the 
convention has not been ratified by all SAARC mem-
bers. India has therefore signed various bilateral 
arrangements with its neighbors and is also working 
on one with Pakistan.85 But the overall context of 
SAARC remains too weak to give a new impetus to 
security cooperation.86 
Potential and Limitations of Cooperation 
With regard to the bilateral conflicts and the political 
resentments between India and its neighbors, a remark-
able network of different forms of security coopera-
tion has developed over the years. This process can be 
seen as a benchmark for domestic changes and the 
improvement of bilateral relations at the same time. 
Dependent on the status of bilateral relations, security 
collaboration ranges from confidence-building meas-
ures to joint training exercises and the exchange of 
forces for joint military operations. The training com-
ponent is the most advanced area, for instance in 
India’s relations with Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. 
But because exact figures are missing, the overall 
impact of these measures in the context of bilateral 
relations is difficult to assess. Even more difficult to 
assess is the extent of police cooperation. It is not 
quite clear if – and what forms of – collaboration will 
emerge from the meetings of the police chiefs on the 
SAARC level. It is also not quite clear what kind of 
agreements the police forces in the border regions 
have for cooperating with the respective authorities 
in neighboring countries, for instance against the 
different forms of trafficking. 
 
 
85  See “Pakistan to Examine India’s Request for an Extra-
dition Treaty,” The Economic Times, May 28, 2012, http:// 
articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-05-28/news/ 
31877077_1_extradition-treaty-mutual-legal-assistance-treaty-
indian-request (accessed January 10, 2014). 
86  See Ganguly, Counterterrorism Cooperation in South Asia 
(see note 8), 8–9; Gordon, “Regionalism and Cross-Border Co-
operation against Crime and Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific” 
(see note 84), 93–94; Michael, India’s Foreign Policy and Regional 
Multilateralism (see note 80), 106. 
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 Reasons for Cooperation 
 
There are several factors and developments that 
have probably contributed to the intensified process 
of security cooperation in recent years. 
The National Level: 
Democracy and Internal Conflicts 
It is one of the paradoxes of South Asia that, on 
the one hand, the region has the largest number of 
absolute poor people globally but, on the other hand, 
also has formally elected democratic governments in 
nearly all countries. This contradicts the often quoted 
assumption of modernization theory, which argues 
for a minimum of economic development as a pre-
requisite for democratic regimes. But neither the 
dynamic of democratic peace nor the argument that 
democracies do not go to war with each other can 
account for security collaboration in South Asia. In 
comparison to established democracies, new democ-
racies show a higher likelihood for conflict with 
regard to their foreign policy behavior. 
The examples of Pakistan and Bangladesh show that 
there is a connection between democratic regimes, 
especially through the ruling coalition and the likeli-
hood of security cooperation. The earliest attempts at 
security collaboration through confidence-building 
measures started during the first government of 
Benazir Bhutto after she was elected in 1988. But the 
case of Pakistan also shows the difficulties of demo-
cratic governments to pursue their interests vis-à-vis 
powerful veto actors such as the Army or parts of the 
security apparatus with regard to the improvement 
of relations with India. The Pakistani military under 
General Musharraf sabotaged the rapprochement 
with India that was initiated by the Lahore process 
in spring 1999 with the Kargil War in the summer 
of that year. The Mumbai attack in November 2008 
ended the composite dialogue, which had started 
in 2004 and brought considerable improvement to 
India-Pakistan relations. 
In the case of Bangladesh, the improvement of 
relations with India is strongly correlated with the 
governments of the Awami League. The democratic 
competition has always had a direct impact on secu-
rity cooperation, especially with regard to militant 
groups operating in Bangladesh. 
Moreover, one can observe that the gap in security 
perceptions has narrowed in recent years. The grow-
ing willingness of South Asian countries to cooperate 
militarily with India indicates that it is no longer their 
big neighbor but rather the various national conflicts 
that are regarded as the main security challenge. Many 
militant and separatist movements operate beyond 
the borders, which has also contributed to the rap-
prochement of threat perceptions between India and 
its neighboring countries. This has created a new basis 
for security collaboration, which was unthinkable 
before. Examples are India’s cooperation with Bhutan 
and Bangladesh against militant groups in the north-
east, the joint efforts with Sri Lanka against the LTTE, 
and the fight against Islamic extremists with Bangla-
desh. In 2012, even the Pakistani military conceded 
that the biggest security threats emanate from domes-
tic challenges and no longer from the external threat 
of India.87 This change in security perceptions within 
the Pakistani Army may have fostered the rapproche-
ment with India and may lead to new forms of con-
fidence-building measures in the future. 
The International Level 
Internationally, there are three different develop-
ments that may have contributed to the increase in 
security collaborations in South Asia in recent years. 
These are first, India’s new South Asia policy; second, 
the SAARC Charter of Democracy; and finally, the 
limited role of external actors. 
87  See “Pakistan Army Sees ‘Internal Threats’ as Greatest 
Security Risk,” Dawn, January 2, 2013, http://www.dawn.com/ 
news/775781/pakistan-army-sees-internal-threats-as-greatest-
security-risk (accessed January 2, 2013). 
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Reasons for Cooperation 
India’s South Asia Policy: 
From Indira to Manmohan Doctrine 
The rapprochement in the threat perceptions can be 
partly explained by the change of India’s policy vis- à-
vis its neighboring countries after 1991. Until then, 
India’s foreign policy toward South Asia was guided by 
the Indira doctrine, named after Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi. According to her, South Asia was regarded as 
part of India’s national security conception. Internal 
conflicts in neighboring states should therefore only 
be managed by New Delhi without interference from 
extra-regional powers or international organiza-
tions.88 
After economic liberalization in 1991, India’s foreign 
policy underwent a fundamental change. Since then, 
foreign direct investment, export promotion, and inte-
gration into the global economy have been put to the 
forefront to foster national development. From this 
perspective, South Asia became less relevant for India’s 
national security but more relevant for its economic 
development. The Gujral doctrine, named after Prime 
Minister Inder Kumar Gujral, indicated this change of 
perspective with the notion of “non-reciprocity,” that 
is, that India would be willing to make unilateral con-
cessions in conflicts with smaller neighbors, which 
was unthinkable before.89 The treaties on water sharing 
with Nepal and Bangladesh from the 1990s have been 
shaped by the spirit of the Gujral doctrine. The follow-
ing BJP governments of Prime Minister Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee have continued this policy. Despite the attacks 
by Islamic militants on the Indian parliament in 
December 2001 and the following crisis with Pakistan 
in summer 2002, Vajpayee decided in favor of another 
offer for negotiations with Pakistan in spring 2003. 
This was the starting point of the composite dialogue, 
which ended in 2008. The government of the United 
Progressive Alliance, under the leadership of the Con-
gress Party under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 
also followed this strategy. The so-called Manmohan 
doctrine put economic relations in the center of 
India’s foreign policy and aimed to intensify national 
development, to increase India’s standing in the dia-
logue with great powers, and to improve relations 
88  See Devin T. Hagerty, “India’s Regional Security Doctrine,” 
Asian Survey 31, no. 4 (April 1991): 351–63; Bhabani Sen Gupta, 
“India: The Next Great Power,” in: Indian Foreign Policy. Agenda 
for the 21st Century, Vol. 1, ed. Lalit Mansingh et al. (New Delhi, 
1997), 129–40. 
89  See I. K. Gujral, A Foreign Policy for India, without place 1998. 
with neighboring countries.90 In May 2013, Prime 
Minister Singh declared that India also wanted to 
increase its security engagement vis-à-vis the countries 
in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean.91 The attempt 
to intensify technological and military cooperation 
could create more resentment among some SAARC 
members compared to the countries in Southeast Asia. 
India’s new foreign policy directives and the new 
unilateral political and economic concessions, for in-
stance to increase intra-regional trade, have not yet 
delivered far-reaching results. Despite India’s initia-
tives, the intra-regional trade in SAARC is still only 
around 5 percent of total trade. But India’s changing 
South Asia policy may have had a signaling effect 
upon their neighbors. If there were governments in 
power that were friendly toward India, the traditional 
hostile images and confrontational stances toward 
India from the 1970s and 1980s could lose their rele-
vance. 
The Multilateral Level: 
The SAARC Charter of Democracy 
The performance of democratic regimes in South Asia 
is comparatively weak in the international context, 
as depicted by governance indicators from the World 
Bank. Moreover, the democratic competition has esca-
lated repeatedly into crises and civil wars, for instance 
in Sri Lanka and Nepal. But despite all deficits and 
shortcomings, there are high levels of confidence in 
South Asian countries in democratic systems, as re-
flected in different surveys.92 The demand for democ-
racy is also reflected in the opposition to authoritarian 
regimes, for instance in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and 
Nepal, which led to the democratization between the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. 
90  See Raja C. Mohan, “The Manmohan Doctrine”, Daily Times, 
February 28, 2005, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default. asp? 
page=story_28-2-2005_pg3_5 (accessed July 13, 2012); Sanjaya 
Baru, India and the World – Economics and Politics of the Manmohan 
Singh Doctrine in Foreign Policy, Working Paper No. 53 (Singa-
pore: Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of 
Singapore, November 2008). 
91  See Vinay Kumar, “India Well Positioned to Become a Net 
Provider of Security: Manmohan Singh,” The Hindu, May 23, 
2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-well-
positioned-to-become-a-net-provider-of-security-manmohan-
singh/article4742337.ece (accessed January 10, 2014). 
92  State of Democracy in South Asia, ed. Harsh Sethi (New Delhi, 
2008), 11. 
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The International Level 
Table 1 
Arms Imports from China and India (in US$ million) 
South Asian countries Imports from China 
 1995 2000 2008 2012 
Imports from India 
 1995 2000 2008 2012 
Bangladesh  9  11  10  301  –  –  –  – 
Nepal  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  – 
Pakistan  261  68  250  852  –  –  –  – 
Sri Lanka  15  29  53  –  –  16  11  – 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Arms Transfers Database,  
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (accessed July 19, 2013) 
 
Therefore, it is not astonishing that SAARC agreed 
on a common Charter of Democracy in 2009.93 In case 
of a military coup in a SAARC country, the charter 
could offer institutional leverage for the other mem-
ber states to enforce sanctions like India did in 2005 
against the monarchy in Nepal. The common demo-
cratic value basis may not be a powerful instrument 
but it certainly has a high symbolic value. On the basis 
of closer cooperation among the democratic regimes, 
new channels of communication can be opened 
between parliaments, parties, and civil society, which 
may contribute to weakening perceptions about tra-
ditional enemies over the long term. Moreover, these 
processes may also promote adjustments in percep-
tions of domestic threats. 
The Role of External Actors: The China Factor 
Another factor that is important for India’s foreign 
policy is China’s increased engagement in South Asia. 
The smaller neighbors have always played the China 
card in order to get support for their bilateral conflicts 
with India. It was most obvious in the case of Pakistan, 
but the other South Asian countries have also system-
atically intensified their economic, political, and mili-
tary relations with Beijing in recent years.94 
Many of the activities between India and its neigh-
boring countries include confidence-building measures, 
training programs, intelligence cooperation, and mili-
tary maneuvers and operations. One important aspect 
of security collaboration, that is, arms exports, is more 
93  See SAARC Secretariat, “SAARC Charter of Democracy,” 
http://www.saarc-sec.org/SAARC-Charter-of-Democracy/88/ 
(accessed July 23, 2013). 
94  See Christian Wagner, Indien als Regionalmacht und Chinas 
wachsender Einfluss in Südasien, SWP-Studie 21/2012 (Berlin: Stif-
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2012). 
or less completely missing in the spectrum of activ-
ities. A comparison of arms exports from China and 
India to four South Asian countries reveals a striking 
picture: India is not regarded as an attractive partner 
for arms and military technology (see Table 1). 
But China’s engagement is not an obstacle for 
security cooperation in South Asia. First, China has 
intensified its relations with India on nearly all levels, 
despite the tensions at the border. Second, in contrast 
to previous times, China seems less inclined to inter-
fere in the domestic and regional conflicts of South 
Asia. This is most obvious in the case of Pakistan, which 
is one of the few strategic partners of Beijing. But for 
many years, the Chinese government has not sup-
ported Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir issue but 
rather assisted India’s stance. Like other great powers, 
China is promoting bilateral talks between the two 
countries and does not promote the implementation 
of UN resolutions. The military cooperation of South 
Asian countries with China is therefore not automati-
cally directed against India. If this was the case, then 
there would be less collaboration on security. But 
instead, there has been an increase in recent years. 
Finally, because of its own domestic problems in Tibet 
and Xinjiang, China shares concerns about domestic 
threat perception and is cooperating with Pakistan to 
close camps of militant Uighurs in the tribal areas at 
the Afghan border. 
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 Prospects: Toward a Security Architecture in South Asia? 
 
South Asia will remain one of the most dangerous 
regions in the future because of the different terri-
torial, political, religious, and social conflicts. But 
it seems that the regional security scenario has 
improved in recent years. 
The likelihood of a nuclear conflict between India 
and Pakistan, a result of bilateral tensions in the 
1990s, has diminished due to the rapprochement of 
both sides. The present security challenges in South 
Asian countries are more linked to the various domes-
tic conflicts rather than to external threats. The 
change in India’s South Asia policy, which views the 
region toady more as a part of India’s market and less 
as a challenge to its national security, has contributed 
to a change in perspective that has resulted in uni-
lateral trade concessions and in compromises on 
bilateral issues. The growing security collaboration 
signals that today India wants to achieve security 
through cooperation rather than confrontation, as 
was the case in the period of the Indira doctrine. These 
changes on the domestic level and in the field of for-
eign policy have therefore created new opportunities 
for security cooperation in the crisis-plagued region. 
The collaboration is characterized by several fea-
tures. First, it is more bilateral (between India and its 
neighbors) rather than regional or multilateral (for 
instance on the SAARC level). Second, security cooper-
ation is still dependent on the overall context of 
bilateral relations and is therefore prone to setbacks. 
The forms of collaboration range from confidence-
building measures between India and Pakistan; to 
capacity-building and training programs between 
India, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka; and to military 
operations, as in the case of Bhutan. Finally, security 
cooperation is not exclusive, which means that mili-
tary relations of India’s neighbors with great powers 
such as China and the United States continue to play 
an important role. But extra-regional powers seem 
less inclined to interfere in domestic or cross-border 
conflicts in the region. 
Despite these new forms of cooperation, it is not 
likely that South Asia will become a “security com-
munity.”95 This would require much more progress 
in the field of regional cooperation and on the 
SAARC level, especially in the societal and economic 
fields. But even high levels of economic interdepen-
dence, which can be observed, for instance, in East 
Asia between China and Japan, does not necessarily 
lead to a rapprochement in security matters. On the 
other hand, low levels of economic interdependence, 
as in the case of SAARC, does not rule out new security 
initiatives. 
Following the discussions on soft or open regional-
ism, security cooperation in Asia will continue to be 
an assembly of different bi- and multilateral relations 
characterized by weak institutionalism and different 
levels of engagement by external powers. As to how 
far these emerging security architectures will be bi- 
or multilateral will depend on the respective regional 
constellations. 
Abbreviations 
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum 
ASF Afghan Security Forces 
DGMO Director General of Military Operations 
DMK Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 
EU European Union 
LoC Line of Control 
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
UN United Nations 
95  See Karl W. Deutsch and Sidney A. Burrell, Political Commu-
nity and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the 
Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1957). 
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